






University of Konstanz 
Department of Economics 
 




Günter Franke and Thomas Weber 
 
http://www.wiwi.uni-konstanz.de/workingpaperseries 
                           Working Paper Series  
2011-21 Tranching and Pricing in CDO-Transactions*** 
 
 








This paper empirically investigates the tranching and tranche pricing of European 
securitization transactions of corporate loans and bonds. Tranching allows the originator to 
issue bonds with strong quality differences and thereby attract heterogeneous investors. We 
find that the number of differently rated tranches in a transaction is inversely related to the 
quality of the underlying asset pool. Credit spreads on tranches in a transaction are inversely 
related to the number of tranches. The average price for transferring a unit of expected default 
risk, paid in a transaction, is inversely related to the default probability of the underlying asset 
pool. The average price, paid for a tranche, increases with the rating of the tranche, it is higher 
for the lowest rated tranche and very high for AAA-tranches in true sale-transactions. It varies 
little across butterfly spreads obtained from rated tranches except for the most senior spread.  
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The financial crisis starting in 2007 is intimately related to the securitization of mortgage 
backed securities. The crisis triggered a general discussion on the future of securitization 
including the role of originators and rating agencies. Currently, banks and regulators attempt 
to revive securitization because it is considered an important instrument for trade and 
allocation of default risks. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the tranching and pricing of 
bond tranches issued in a sample of European CDO (collateralized debt obligation)-
transactions. Investors and originators can evaluate the costs and benefits of securitization 
only if they understand tranching and pricing. These properties are also important 
determinants of the social costs and benefits of securitizations. Mispricing of tranches, for 
example, might lead to misallocation of risks and necessitate regulation.  
We analyse tranching and pricing because they are interdependent. In a perfect market 
tranching would be irrelevant. Market imperfections drive tranching and pricing. In most 
transactions, several differently rated tranches are issued to lower the average credit spread. In 
our sample of CDO-transactions corporate loans and bonds are securitized, as opposed to 
mortgage-backed securities transactions. The rating agencies have been criticised for overly 
optimistic ratings of mortgage-backed securities, but not for their ratings of CDO-
transactions. The ratings of corporate loans and bonds have been quite stable until 2008. This 
also holds for the securitization of these instruments (Newman et al (2008)). Therefore 
insights from CDO-transactions launched before the crisis still appear useful for 
understanding securitizations.  
CDO-transactions can be split in CLO- and CBO-transactions. In a collateralized loan 
obligation (CLO)-transaction a bank usually securitizes part of its corporate loans. In a 
collateralized bond (CBO)-transaction, a bank or an investment company buys corporate 
bonds, pools them and securitizes the asset pool. The transaction is either a true sale or a 
synthetic transaction. In a true sale transaction the originator sells the asset pool without 
recourse to a special purpose vehicle which funds itself through issuing an equity tranche and 
rated tranches. In a synthetic transaction the originator transfers the default risk of the 
underlying asset pool to a special purpose vehicle through a credit default swap. The special 
purpose vehicle also issues differently rated tranches, but usually only for a small portion of 
the par value of the asset pool.  
The allocation of default losses to the issued tranches is governed by strict subordination. In a 
true sale transaction the equity tranche is usually not rated and called the First Loss Position 
(FLP). All default losses of the underlying asset pool are allocated exclusively to the FLP 
  - 2 -until it is exhausted. Losses exceeding the FLP are allocated exclusively to the tranche with 
the lowest rating until it is exhausted, then exclusively to the tranche with the second lowest 
rating and so on. Therefore, the rated tranches exhibit strong quality differences. Strict 
subordination can be characterized also by the attachment and detachment point of tranches. 
These points are defined by special portfolio loss rates, i.e. ratios of default losses over the par 
value of the underlying asset pool. The attachment point of a tranche defines the portfolio loss 
rate such that the tranche incurs (no) losses whenever the portfolio loss rate is above (below) 
the attachment point. The detachment point of a tranche equals its attachment point plus its 
size, with the size of a tranche being its par value divided by the par value of the asset pool. 
Whenever the portfolio loss rate exceeds the detachment point of a tranche, then this tranche 
is fully exhausted by default losses. The detachment point of a tranche also defines the 
attachment point of the tranche with the adjacent better rating. In a true sale-transaction the 
sizes of the equity tranche, i.e. the First Loss Position, and the rated tranches add up to 1. The 
investors buying the rated tranches take the Second Loss Position.  
In synthetic transactions loss allocation is somewhat different. The size of the FLP is a 
threshold of the portfolio loss rate such that the credit default swap only covers losses beyond 
the FLP. The credit default swap covers losses only up to its par value. This par value defines 
a Second Loss Position taken by the investors who buy the tranches from the special purpose 
vehicle. Losses which exceed the FLP and the par value of the credit default swap are born by 
the originator unless she insures against these losses. These non-securitized losses on the 
super-senior claims define a Third Loss Position. Such a position does not exist in true sale 
transactions. 
Given the underlying asset pool, the originator, together with rating agencies and important 
investors, decides about the First Loss Position and the tranching of the rated bonds. In an 
imperfect market, these decisions may matter because of regulatory costs, management and 
transaction costs, costs related to asymmetric information, illiquidity premiums. To our best 
knowledge, this paper is the first to look at the interdependencies between tranching, pricing 
and asset pool quality. As the size of the FLP has been investigated in another paper (Franke, 
Herrmann and Weber 2008), this paper analyses the tranching and pricing of rated tranches.  
The main findings of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, the number of 
differently rated tranches varies between 1 and 6. It tends to be higher for an asset pool of 
lower quality, i.e. a portfolio with a higher expected default loss or less diversification. For a 
lower asset pool quality a more differentiated tranching apparently pays for the originator. 
Also, a larger asset pool appears to raise the number of differently rated tranches, indicating 
  - 3 -economies of scale effects. The tranche ratings are concentrated in the high rating classes. 
About 14 percent of the tranches are sub-investment grade. For lower quality-asset pools we 
often observe more tranches with lower ratings. Yet, within a transaction, tranches tend to be 
clustered more in the range of high than of low ratings.  
In 88 percent of the transactions there exists a Aaa-tranche. In true sale-transactions, we 
observe very thick Aaa-tranches while in synthetic transactions the Aaa-tranche is usually 
very thin. Thickness or size of a tranche is defined by the par value of the tranche, divided by 
the par value of the underlying portfolio. In true sale-transactions the originator maximizes 
the size of the Aaa-tranche since the credit spread on this tranche is lower than that on any 
other tranche. In synthetic transactions the originator chooses a thin Aaa-tranche. This tranche 
may be an important quality signal for investors and regulators justifying its existence. But it 
is likely to be of little use in transferring default risk. Given high credit spreads of Aaa-
tranches relative to corporate bonds and the restriction in synthetic transactions that the funds 
from issuing bond tranches need to be invested in top quality securities, presumably it does 
not pay for the originator to issue a higher volume of such a tranche than needed for 
signalling purposes. 
Second, given the asset pool and the FLP, the originator tranches so as to minimize her 
transaction costs plus the weighted average credit spread paid on the rated tranches, besides of 
other costs such as the costs of required equity capital. Since weighted average credit spreads 
cannot be reasonably compared across transactions, we analyse annual risk premiums. The 
annual risk premium of the rated tranches in a transaction is defined as the weighted average 
credit spread minus the expected annual default loss borne by the rated tranches. To derive it, 
we approximate the probability distribution of the default loss rate of an asset pool by a 
lognormal distribution. This is clearly an approximation which could lead to biased results. 
We find for true sale-transactions that the annual risk premium of all rated tranches increases 
with the weighted average default probability of the underlying asset pool. This is not 
surprising since a higher weighted average default probability tends to raise the volume of 
transferred default risk which in turn should raise the risk premium. The risk premium 
declines in the number of rated tranches. More tranches apparently allow the originator to 
better tailor the tranches to differentiated investor needs so as to extract more investor rents. 
Also a higher number of tranches provides more information to investors and, thus, may 
mitigate information asymmetry problems and thereby reduce credit spreads.  
Third, consider the relative risk premium of all rated tranches, i.e. the annual risk premium 
divided by the expected annual default loss of all rated tranches. The relative risk premium is 
  - 4 -the average price for the transfer of a unit of expected default loss. It would be zero in a 
perfect, risk-neutral market. Our findings indicate that this price declines in the weighted 
average default probability of the underlying portfolio and increases in the size of the FLP. 
These price sensitivities are presumably driven by a pricing kernel effect. A lower asset pool 
quality tends to be associated with relatively more default losses in “cheap” macro states, i.e. 
in states with low stochastic discount factors. This property should also hold for all rated 
tranches together, lowering the average price for the transfer of a unit of expected default loss. 
Consistent with this, a higher share of expected default losses borne by the FLP raises the 
average price because it tends to take away default losses in the “cheap” macro states. A 
higher number of tranches lowers the average price, consistent with extracting more investor 
rents. The observed negative impact of asset pool diversification on the average price is 
consistent with an information asymmetry effect. More diversification tends to reduce 
information asymmetry which might reduce credit spreads. 
Fourth, the empirical analysis of individual tranches mostly confirms the results for the risk 
premiums of all rated tranches. While the annual risk premium of a tranche increases with the 
weighted average default probability of the underlying asset pool, the relative risk premium 
declines. A higher number of subordinated tranches tends to lower the annual risk premium of 
a tranche. This finding is not surprising since more subordinated tranches indicate a higher 
attachment point of the tranche, reducing its expected default loss. Interestingly, the 
explanatory power of the number of subordinated tranches is stronger than that of the 
attachment point. The negative impact of the number of subordinated tranches is also 
consistent with an information asymmetry effect since more tranches mitigate this asymmetry.  
Fifth, in general, the relative risk premium of a tranche increases with its attachment point, 
also with its rating. This finding can be explained by a pricing kernel effect. Against the rule, 
the lowest rated tranche generates a higher relative risk premium than the mezzanine tranches. 
This suggests a complexity premium of the lowest rated tranche, perhaps for more expensive 
risk management of this tranche. Much more dramatic, however, is the very high relative risk 
premium paid on Aaa-tranches in true sale-transactions. This can be attributed to a very 
strong pricing kernel effect. Aaa-tranches tend to incur default losses only in states in which 
the aggregate default losses are very high indicating high stochastic discount factors. Since 
Aaa-tranches should be very information-insensitive, the high relative risk premium cannot be 
explained by information asymmetry. To check the pricing kernel effects more carefully, we 
also analyse butterfly spreads, similar to state-contingent claims. Surprisingly, we do not fing 
a significant relation between the relative risk premium of a butterfly spread and its 
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increases with the attachment point. Hence the finding that the relative risk premium of a 
tranche increases with its attachment point should not be taken as evidence of a monotonically 
increasing pricing kernel.  
These findings are new, to our best knowledge, and improve our understanding of tranching 
and pricing in securitization transactions. The evidence is based on a set of European 
securitization transactions which may not be representative for other parts of the globe.   
Also the financial crisis has led to changes in regulation and behaviour of originators and 
investors. Therefore tranching and pricing might have changed. Further research is needed to 
better understand these issues. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a literature review. Section 3 
derives hypotheses about tranching and pricing. These hypotheses are tested and discussed in 
section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2 Literature  Review   
Various theoretical papers analyse the optimal design of financial contracts. Several papers 
advocate the benefits of tranching in the presence of information asymmetry between the 
seller and the buyer of a claim. Tranching allows to differentiate the degree of information-
sensitivity of the issued securities. Boot and Thakor (1993) argue that a risky cash flow should 
be split into a senior and a subordinated security. The senior security is information-
insensitive and can be sold to uninformed investors while the subordinated security is 
information-sensitive and should be sold to informed investors. This allows the seller of the 
cash flow to raise the sales revenue. Riddiough (1997) extends this reasoning by showing that 
loan bundling allows for portfolio diversification which mitigates information asymmetries. 
DeMarzo (2005) considers a bank which may securitize a portfolio of debt claims by issuing a 
collateralized debt obligation (CDO). The bank can sell claims separately and, thereby, signal 
information about the quality of the different loans. Pooling the claims precludes this, but 
leads to a well-diversified portfolio mitigating information asymmetries. This allows the 
originator to issue low-risk, information-insensitive tranches. DeMarzo argues that for large 
portfolios the diversification benefit of pooling outweighs the information destruction cost.  
To analyse the pricing of securitization tranches, it is necessary to model the distribution of 
the portfolio default losses. Many papers discuss this issue. Duffie and Garleanu (2001) 
suggest a default risk model using obligor default intensities. They discuss Moody´s diversity 
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including the weighted average default probability, the default correlation and the diversity 
score. Krahnen and Wilde (2008) simulate the portfolio loss rate distribution and the tranche 
loss rate distributions for CDO-transactions. They also analyse the sensitivity of these loss 
rate distributions to changes in the simulation parameters. The differences between the loss 
rate distributions of standard bonds and CDO-tranches are nicely illustrated
1. Duffie et al 
(2009) argue that models underestimate the tail risks because they miss unobservable, non-
stationary risk factors which raise default correlations. Also Berndt, Ritchken and Sun (2010) 
address default correlations in several ways; shocks to the economy can cause jumps in the 
credit spreads. Tarashew (2010) shows that parameter uncertainty also raises the tail risk. 
Albrecher, Ladoucette and Schoutens (2007) propose a generic one factor Lévy model for the 
portfolio loss rate distribution. Burtschell, Gregory and Laurent (2009) derive default 
intensities for CDOs using models with one latent factor and different copulas. Krekel (2008) 
proposes a Gaussian base correlation model with correlated recovery rates to improve the 
empirical model fit. 
Several empirical papers investigate individual name corporate bond spreads and find high 
expected excess returns, e.g. Driessen (2005) and Chen, Collin–Dufresne, Goldstein (2009). 
This is often referred to as the ‘credit spread puzzle’. Elton et al (2001) find that only a small 
fraction of credit spreads is explained by expected default losses, substantial fractions are 
explained by tax and liquidity effects. Other empirical papers study the tranching and pricing 
in securitizations. Amato and Remolona (2003) analyze the credit spread puzzle and, in 
particular, investigate collateralized bond obligations. They find very high average spread 
ratios of the tranches; the spread ratio of a bond is defined as its promised spread divided by 
its annualized expected default loss. They argue that, due to the strong skewness of the default 
loss distribution, idiosyncratic default risk cannot be fully diversified in typical bond 
portfolios, and therefore earns a significant premium.  
Childs, Ott and Riddiough (1996) investigate the pricing of Commercial Mortage-Backed 
securities (CMBS) and conclude that the correlation structure of the asset pool and the 
tranching are important determinants of the launch spreads of the tranches. Maris and Segal 
(2002) examine credit spreads in CMBS-transactions and document the empirical impact of 
several macro-variables, similar to Duffee (1998). Titman, Tompaidis and Tsyplakov (2005) 
analyse determinants of credit spreads in MBS-transactions and find that spreads widen after 
poor performance of real estate markets. Cuchra and Jenkinson (2005) analyse the number of 
tranches in securitizations and conclude that the number increases with sophistication of 
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Cuchra (2005) analyses the initial spreads of tranches in securitizations and finds that ratings 
are very important determinants besides of general capital market conditions.  
Longstaff and Rajan (2008) analyze the market prices of tranches on the CDX credit index. 
They find a three-modal loss rate distribution and attribute about two thirds of the CDX 
spread variations to firm specific risk, one fourth to market expectations about joint defaults 
of firms in an industry, the remaining small rest to systemic default risk. The paper which is 
closest to ours is Weber (2008). He uses launch spreads of tranches in synthetic CDO-
transactions and information on the underlying portfolio quality to derive levels of relative 
risk aversion implied by the credit spreads of tranches. He finds significantly higher levels of 
relative risk aversion for better rated tranches indicating high risk premiums for defaults in 
states with high aggregate default losses. Deteriorating portfolio quality lowers relative risk 
aversion. Weber also finds that the lowest rated tranche of a transaction earns an additional 
risk premium and that deteriorating portfolio diversification increases risk premiums for the 
two lowest rated tranches. He interprets this as evidence for additional costs due to 
information asymmetries
2.  
Finally, several recent papers address moral hazard issues in securitizations, for example 
Purnanandam (2008), Loutskina and Strahan (2009) and Piskorski, Seru and Vig (2010).  
 
3  Derivation of Hypotheses 
This section derives hypotheses about tranching and pricing in securitization transactions. 
Given the underlying asset pool in a transaction, tranching is defined by the size of the non-
rated FLP, the number and the properties of the rated tranches. The offering circular shows 
for each tranche the attachment and the detachment point, the rating and the credit spread so 
that this is public information. The originator decides about the number, the ratings and credit 
spreads of rated tranches, in cooperation with rating agencies and major investors. Rating 
agencies play a very important role in this process. They determine the attachment and 
detachment points of the tranches and their ratings. The main tool for determining these 
tranche properties are simulation models, supplemented by stress tests and the analysis of 
various transaction characteristics. We derive hypotheses about tranching and pricing by 
analysing, first, effects of market imperfections, and, second, pricing kernel effects.  
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Tranching and pricing are driven by market imperfections. They include transaction and 
management costs, incompleteness of capital markets, costs of regulatory equity capital, 
illiquidity and liquidity risks of securities, taxes and information asymmetries between the 
originator and investors. Investors buy rated tranches to optimize their expected net income 
and their risk. Net income is defined as the gross income (= interest income - funding costs - 
default losses) minus other costs including transaction costs and taxes. Investors demand 
credit spreads which compensate them for their costs and the tranche risks. The level of these 
costs and risks may depend on tranching. Hence the originator may use tranching to reduce 
these costs.  
 
3.1.1  Market incompleteness, portfolio quality and information asymmetry 
Market incompleteness is one reason for tranching. If markets are incomplete, then adding 
new securities which are not spanned by existing securities is mostly beneficial (Marin/Rahi 
(2000)). New securities enlarge the set of trading opportunities for investors and, thus, allow 
them to put together portfolios which better fit their needs. This should lower credit spreads 
and, thus, motivate the originator to issue many rated tranches (Cuchra (2005))
3.  
Arguments for tranching can also be derived from information asymmetry. (1) A bank 
securitizing part of its loan portfolio is likely to know more about the quality of the 
underlying loans than investors. According to Boot and Thakor (1993), the originator should 
split the bonds in a securitization transaction into information-insensitive senior and 
information-sensitive junior bonds (see also DeMarzo and Duffie (1999)). This idea can be 
extended to the subset of rated tranches. More differently rated tranches provide more 
differentiation of information sensitivity and, thus, may better fit investor needs. (2) A higher 
number of rated tranches provides more information to investors. For each rated tranche, the 
attachment and the detachment points together with the rating and the credit spread are 
published. This information helps investors to more reliably infer the parameters of the 
portfolio loss rate distribution. (3) Suppose that tranche-ratings are governed by tranche-
default probabilities as is true of S&P and Fitch. Split one tranche with a given size and a 
given rating into two tranches which together have the same size. Hence the new senior 
tranche has a better rating. As ratings affect credit spreads in the presence of information 
asymmetries, tranche splitting should reduce the overall credit spread paid on both tranches 
(see also Brennan/Hein/Poon 2009). (4) A higher number of rated tranches may provide 
investors of senior tranches with more early warning signals. Each time a subordinated 
  - 9 -tranche is hit by default losses for the first time, a signal is sent. The more rated tranches 
exist, the more signals are sent, the smaller information asymmetry may be, perhaps leading 
to smaller credit spreads. The preceding arguments motivate  
 
Hypothesis 1: Given the underlying portfolio quality and the size of the equity tranche, a 
higher number of differently rated tranches reduces the weighted average credit spread of the 
rated tranches. 
 
The optimal number of tranches chosen by the originator depends on marginal costs and 
benefits of tranches. The originator´s management and transaction costs increase in the 
number of tranches. Hence there is a tradeoff between the benefits and costs of additional 
tranches. As the marginal benefit declines, an interior optimal number of tranches should 
exist. Due to economies of scale-effects, a higher transaction volume should raise the 
marginal tranche benefit, and, thus, the optimal number of tranches.  
The marginal benefit of a tranche should be inversely related to the quality of the underlying 
asset pool for two reasons. First, given a very good quality, there is little to be gained by 
tranching. Hence we should observe only a few tranches. For a low asset pool quality, the loss 
rate distribution would have a high mean and be broad providing more room for differently 
rated tranches.  
Second, the marginal benefit of a tranche should be higher, the stronger is the information 
asymmetry between the originator and investors. This asymmetry cannot be observed directly. 
We proxy it by the asset pool quality. We conjecture an inverse relation between asset pool 
quality and information asymmetry. Rating agencies publish information on the asset pool 
quality. It can be measured by the weighted average default probability of the asset pool 
(WADP) and its diversity score (DS). WADP is an average of the default probabilities of all 
assets, weighted by the par values of assets. Since the loss given default for each asset is often 
not available, assume that it is a constant being the same for all assets. Then the expected 
portfolio loss rate equals WADP, multiplied by this constant. The second measure of asset 
pool quality is asset pool diversification. The diversification of the loan portfolio can be 
summarized in a diversity measure as done in Moody´s Diversity Score (DS) or, in a refined 
version, an adjusted diversity score (ADS). An increase in WADP lowers asset pool quality 
while an increase in DS improves it. Errors in estimating WADP are likely to be proportional 
to the true WADP, implying a positive relation between WADP and information asymmetry. 
But a high DS reduces information asymmetries because the idiosyncratic risks of the assets 
are diversified away (DeMarzo (2005)). This inverse relation between asset pool quality and 
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Weber (2008) about asset pool quality and loss allocation in securitization transactions. They 
find that a better quality reduces the size of the FLP. The FLP is the most important credit 
enhancement in a securitization to mitigate problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Hence we use asset pool quality as an inversely related proxy for information asymmetry. The 
preceding arguments support  
 
Hypothesis 2:  
a)  The optimal number of differently rated tranches is inversely related to the quality of the 
asset pool. 
b)  The optimal number of differently rated tranches grows with the transaction volume. 
 
3.1.2  Costs of Equity Capital and Funding Costs 
Within a transaction the credit spread is lower for a tranche with a better rating. Hence every 
originator minimizes the attachment of the Aaa-tranche to minimize credit spreads. Also 
regulators require less equity capital for a better rated tranche under Basel II
4. Therefore, the 
originator maximizes the size of the Aaa-tranche in a fully funded true sale-transaction. 
In synthetic transactions the revenue from issuing tranches needs to be invested in top quality-
securities so that the originator cannot use it for funding. As shown by Franke, Herrmann and 
Weber (2008), synthetic transactions are preferred to true sale transactions by banks with a 
strong rating. For them funding through standard bank bonds appears to be cheaper than 
funding through a Aaa-tranche. Also a Aaa-tranche does not allow a substantial default risk 
transfer so that we should not observe Aaa-tranches in synthetic transactions. Yet, most 
synthetic transactions include a Aaa-tranche. The purpose of this tranche may be to provide a 
quality signal to investors and regulators. Also the quality of the non-securitized super-senior 
tranche should be even better than that of the Aaa-tranche, implying very little regulatory 
capital and low cost of buying protection for default risk. For these purposes, a very small 
Aaa-tranche should suffice in synthetic transactions. This motivates 
 
Hypothesis 3: In true sale-transactions the originator chooses a very large Aaa-tranche, in 
synthetic transactions a very small Aaa-tranche. 
 
3.2  Absolute and Relative Risk Premiums of Rated Tranches 
3.2.1  Loss Volume and Information Asymmetry  
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liquidity, maturity and other effects (Driessen 2005). This should also be true for initial credit 
spreads of tranches in securitization transactions. Since we analyse initial credit spreads, we 
need not care about seasoning effects. We do not have data on taxes, transaction costs and 
liquidity premiums for our set of European transactions. Therefore we refrain from modelling 
these determinants of credit spreads. To investigate the pricing of default losses in 
securitization transactions, we focus on the volume of expected default losses, on information 
asymmetry effects and on pricing kernel effects. We analyse the annual risk premiums of 
rated tranches,  
annual risk premium of tranche = tranche credit spread  
  - expected tranche loss per € invested /transaction maturity 
Since the credit spread is the spread earned per € invested, we subtract the annualized 
expected tranche loss per € invested. It equals the expected default loss borne by the tranche 
divided by its par value and by the maturity of the transaction. Without loss of generality, we 
assume a par value of 1 € for the transaction volume. Then the default loss of the asset pool 
equals its loss rate and the par value of a tranche equals its size. For simplicity, the tranche 
loss per € invested is denoted the tranche loss. 
The annual risk premium is the credit spread of the tranche minus its expected annual default 
loss. If investors are risk averse, then a higher expected tranche loss should imply a higher 
annual risk premium. 
 
Hypothesis 4 (loss volume effect):  
a)  An increase in the annualized expected tranche loss raises its annual risk premium. 
b)  Given the loss share of the First Loss Position, the annual risk premium of the rated 
tranches increases with the weighted average default probability of the asset pool. 
 
Hypothesis 4a) relates the annual risk premium of an individual tranche to its expected loss 
volume. Hypothesis 4b) addresses the annual risk premium of all rated tranches in a 
transaction. The annual risk premium of the rated tranches in a transaction is defined as the 
weighted average credit spread minus the annualized expected default loss borne by the rated 
tranches. Assuming the same loss given default across transactions, the expected default loss 
rate of the asset pool is determined by its weighted average default probability. By Hypothesis 
4b), a higher expected loss rate of the asset pool should raise the annual risk premium of the 
rated tranches, given the loss share of the First Loss Position. This share is defined as the 
  - 12 -expected default loss borne by the First Loss Position, divided by the expected loss of the 
asset pool. Given the loss share, the expected loss of the rated tranches increases with the 
weighted average default probability of the asset pool so that the risk premium should 
increase (Hypothesis 4b). This is not precisely true for synthetic transactions because the loss 
share of the non-securitized Third Loss Position might change. But this share is very small 
anyway so that we ignore it here. 
To address information asymmetry effects, we analyse the annual risk premium and the 
relative risk premium.  
relative risk premium of tranche = annual risk premium of tranche/ annualized expected 
tranche loss  
The relative risk premium of a tranche can be interpreted as the average risk price per unit of 
expected default loss for this tranche. It would be zero in a perfect, risk-neutral market; then 
the credit spread would cover the expected loss only. Amato/Remolona (2003) and Chen et al 
(2009) use the risk-neutral over the physical probability of default losses to analyse the credit 
spread puzzle. This measure is closely related to ours.  
Since investors are averse to information asymmetry, this asymmetry should raise the annual 
and the relative tranche-risk premiums.  
 
Hypothesis 5 (information asymmetry effect): The annual and relative risk premiums of rated 
tranches increase with information asymmetry. Hence they are inversely related to asset pool 
quality, to the loss share of the First Loss Position and the number of rated tranches. 
 
The impact of asset pool quality and the number of rated tranches on information asymmetry 
has been discussed before. A higher First Loss Position discourages the originator from 
adverse selection and moral hazard so that a higher loss share should reduce information 
asymmetry, and, thus, risk premiums. 
 
3.2.2  Pricing Kernel Effects 
More complicated are the pricing kernel effects on tranche pricing. Several studies find that 
the relative risk premium is lower for bonds and loans with a lower rating. For European Aaa, 
Aa, A and Baa rated bonds Amato/Remolona (2003) find average ratios of credit spreads over 
annualised expected losses of 210, 35, 6.7 and 1.6, respectively. For the US, they report 625 
for Aaa-bonds and 2.2 for Baa-bonds. Berndt et al (2005) find that the ratio of risk neutral 
over actual default intensities is higher for safer firms. Similarly, Chen et al (2009) find much 
  - 13 -higher values for Aaa- than for Baa-firms. Similar effects should also be observed for 
securitizations with different WADPs of the asset pools. Weber (2008) looked into synthetic 
transactions and derived the portfolio loss rate distribution by a simulation model. Using a 
pricing kernel with constant relative risk aversion, he finds that the estimated relative risk 
aversion is highest for the Aaa-tranche and lower for lower rated tranches except for the 
lowest rated tranche. Since the Aaa-tranche only bears the tail risk which is likely to 
materialize in states of high aggregate default losses, the tail risk should command a high risk 
premium. But it should be kept in mind that the estimation of the tail risk is particularly 
sensitive to estimation errors. Therefore the estimates of the Aaa-tranche risk premiums 
should be interpreted with caution. The intuition for all these findings is that the losses of the 
better rated bonds are more heavily concentrated in bad macro-states with high stochastic 
discount factors.  
To model the pricing kernel effect, we assume that the stochastic discount factor depends on a 
macro-factor and, perhaps, orthogonal industry-factors. The macro-factor might be the 
aggregate default loss rate in the economy. This would be true in a world in which investors 
only bear default risk. But even if investors also invest in stocks, it is likely that stock prices 
are depressed when default losses in the economy are high and vice versa. Therefore the 
pricing kernel is likely to be an increasing function of the aggregate default loss rate. It might 
also increase in industry default rates. Given a rather well-diversified asset pool it is likely 
that the asset pool-loss rate is strongly positively correlated with the aggregate default rate.  
For illustration, consider a standard linear Gordy-type model (2003) and combine it with the 
KMV-approach (see also Tarashew (2010)). We use this simple model to illustrate the basic 
idea which also holds in more sophisticated models. In this model, the ate t - total market 
value of an obligor firm in industry i, V(t), divided by the current market value V(0), is driven 
by the aggregate default rate m, an orthogonal industry-factor ni and an idiosyncratic risk 
factor ε, all standardized to zero expectation and unit variance,  
 
V(t)/V(0) = a + σ[ - m √ρ - ni√ρ + ε √(1- ρ- ρ)] 
 
-√ρ is the correlation coefficient between the firm value and the macro-factor, -√ρ  the 
correlation coefficient between the firm value and the orthogonal industry-factor. V(t)/V(0) 
has an expectation of a and a standard deviation of σ. Suppose that the firm defaults when 
V(t) falls below a given trigger D. Then, assuming that the industry-factor and the 
idiosyncratic factor are normally distributed, the physical PD of the obligor, conditional on m, 
is given by  
  - 14 - 
PD(m) = Prob(V(t) ≤ D│m) = N((-∆ + m√ρ)/√(1-ρ)) 
 
with ∆ = (a-D/V(0))/σ being the distance to default and N(.) the cumulative standard normal 
distribution. Clearly, the conditional PD increases with the aggregate default rate if ρ> 0. 
To see the impact of the macro-factor on tranche pricing, first consider a standard corporate 
bond. Then a lower obligor quality, measured by a smaller distance to default, should raise the 
annualized risk premium, because the volume of expected default losses increases. But, given 
a negative correlation between firm value and macro-factor, the relative risk premium should 
decline because default losses should be concentrated relatively more in the “cheap” macro-
states where the macro-factor, say the aggregate default rate, is low
5. If the orthogonal 
industry-factor is also priced, this might reinforce the decline in the relative risk premium. 
Hence the relative risk premium should decline if the distance to default does. This is in line 
with the empirical findings for corporate bonds. Similarly, the relative risk premium for the 
asset pool underlying a securitization should decline with the pool-distance to default.  
For a rated tranche, the distance to default-effect is complicated by the feedback-effect on its 
attachment point. A higher WADP of the asset pool tends to raise the FLP and also the 
attachment points of the rated tranches, given their ratings. An increase in the attachment 
point, ceteris paribus, should raise the relative risk premium of the tranche because a higher 
attachment point tends to concentrate tranche losses in the range of “expensive” macro-states 
with high aggregate default rates. This motivates Hypothesis 6a). 
 
Hypothesis 6 (pricing kernel and attachment point effects):  
a)  The relative risk premium of a rated tranche increases with its attachment point.  
b)  An increase in the weighted average default probability of the asset pool lowers the 
relative risk premiums of the rated tranches with a low rating and raises those of highly 
rated tranches. 
c)  An increase in the diversity score of the asset pool lowers the relative risk premiums of 
all rated tranches. 
 
To motivate Hypothesis 6b), we analyse two opposing effects of an increase in the WADP of 
the asset pool. While the relative risk premium of the asset pool tends to decline with 
increasing WADP, the likely increase in the attachment point of a tranche should raise its 
relative risk premium. If the pricing kernel is relatively flat for a wide range of macro-states 
  - 15 -and increases strongly in the bad macro-states, then the attachment point effect should be 
relatively small for tranches with low attachment points. Therefore the relative risk premium 
of the lower rated tranches should decline with increasing WADP. For tranches with high 
attachment points, we might see the opposite result because the default losses are 
concentrated in the very bad macro states. Then the attachment point effect might dominate 
the WADP-effect. 
Hypothesis 6c) relates to asset pool diversification. A higher diversity score concentrates asset 
pool default losses around the expected loss rate. Assuming value additivity, this should have 
no effect on the relative risk premium of the asset pool. Hence the effect of the DS on the 
relative risk premium of a tranche should be driven by the attachment point effect. Suppose 
that the attachment point is larger than the expected portfolio loss rate
6. Then a higher DS 
should lower the attachment point of a rated tranche to preserve its PD or its expected loss. As 
a consequence, according to Hypothesis 6a), the relative tranche-risk premium should decline.  
 
A final hypothesis concerns the importance of ratings for risk premiums. Rating agencies 
claim to have very good information so that their ratings depend little on information 
asymmetries. Also, ratings appear to be very important for investors. This suggests that 
investors rely more on tranche rating than on asset pool quality and observable tranche 
properties. This motivates 
 
Hypothesis 7: The annual and the relative risk premium of a tranche are better explained by 
the tranche rating than by the underlying portfolio quality, the size and the attachment point 
of the tranche.  
 
These hypotheses will be tested in the following. 
 
4 Empirical  Findings 
4.1 Summary  Statistics 
Our empirical analysis is based on 167 European CDO-transactions. Except for two poorly 
documented transactions, these transactions include all European CDO-transactions between 
the end of 1997 and the end of 2005, for which we know Moody´s diversity score and for 
which we can derive WADP. These transactions represent about half of the European CDO-
transactions over this time period. The data are collected from offering circulars, Moody´s 
presale reports on CDO-transactions and from the Deutsche Bank Almanac.  
  - 16 -Moody´s diversity score DS was criticized as a diversification measure because it ignores 
correlations between obligors of different industries. The adjusted diversity score is a more 
sophisticated diversification measure; it assumes an asset correlation ρex between all obligors 
in the underlying asset pool and an additional correlation ( ρint - ρex ) for obligors within the 
same industry. Rating agencies use these correlations in their simulation models to derive the 
loss rate distributions of asset pools. We use additional information on the industry structure 
of asset pools from securitization documents to derive the adjusted diversity score ADS. This 
is possible only for 92 transactions. We assume an intra-industry correlation ρint = 20 percent 
and an inter-industry correlation of ρex = 0, 2 or 4 percent. There is no agreement on the 
“correct” asset correlations. As illustrated in Fender/Kiff (2004) and confirmed in informal 
discussions with the rating agencies, the assumed correlations appear to be roughly in line 
with those used by the agencies.  
First, we present some summary statistics (Table 1). About 48 % are true sale-transactions, 
about 52 % are synthetic. About 44 (56) % are CLO (CBO)-transactions. Most of the 
transactions were set up between 2000 and 2004.  
 
- Table 1- 
 
As shown in Table 2, the weighted average default probability (WADP) is, on average, much 
smaller for synthetic than for true sale-transactions. As expected, the FLP shows a similar 
pattern. CLO-transactions tend to be much better diversified than CBO-transactions.  
 
- Table 2 - 
 
Table 3 provides an overview of the tranching. In many transactions, there are some rated 
tranches which are not subordinated to each other. For example, two equally ranking tranches 
are denominated in different currencies or one tranche pays a fixed coupon while the other 
tranche pays a floating rate. We count tranches of equal ranking as one tranche because we 
focus on quality differentiation in tranching. As the upper and the lower panel in Table 3 
show, the number of tranches with different ratings varies between 1 and 6. Most transactions 
have 3 to 5 differently rated tranches. 14 transactions have only one rated tranche (single-
tranche deals
7) while 6 transactions have 6 tranches. In 9 transactions with 4 or 5 tranches 
there are two strictly subordinated Aaa-tranches which we count as two differently rated 
tranches. The total number of tranches within a rating class is, by far, the highest for Aaa. 88 
  - 17 -% of all transactions have at least one Aaa-tranche. Also, there is a concentration of tranches 
in Aa2, A2, Baa2 and Ba2 which correspond to the “even” S&P-ratings AA, A, BBB and BB. 
The tranches in the few-tranche-deals are mostly concentrated in the good rating classes. The 
more tranches are issued, the more likely low rated tranches are issued, too. About 14% of the 
tranches are subinvestment-grade. They exist mostly in 4, 5- and 6-tranche deals. B-rated 
tranches are issued only in synthetic deals with at least 4 tranches.  
 
- Table 3 - 
 
Additional evidence on tranche rating can be obtained by looking at the rating range and the 
average rating gap for transactions with at least two rated tranches. The rating range of a 
transaction, i.e. the range between the lowest and the highest rating within a transaction, is 
defined as (1 + the difference between the lowest and the highest rated tranche measured in 
rating notches). We assign 1 to the rating Aaa, 2 to Aa1, 3 to Aa2 and so forth until 16 to B3. 
Given at least two rated tranches, the minimum rating range is 2 while the maximum rating 
range is 16 (for a transaction with a Aaa- and a B3-tranche). In addition, define for each 
transaction 
average rating gap = ( rating range - number of rated tranches) /(number of rated tranches -1). 
It indicates how many notches between two adjacent tranche ratings are missing on average 
within a transaction. Table 4 gives the results. 
 
- Table 4 - 
 
This table supports the visual impression of Table 3 that a higher number of tranches is 
associated with a wider rating range. Since most transactions have a Aaa-tranche, a higher 
number of tranches tends to add tranches with lower ratings. While the median rating gap is 4 
given 2 rated tranches, it declines to 2, given 4 or more rated tranches. Hence even though a 
higher number of tranches includes tranches with lower ratings, the median rating gap 
declines, indicating a stronger clustering of ratings. 
If there are more than two rated tranches, then the question arises whether these tranches are 
clustered more in the higher or the lower rating range. Define for each transaction  
 
    rating asymmetry measure = ∑i (rating gap i/average rating gap of transaction) (i/∑i)   - 1 
 
  - 18 -The rating gap between two adjacent tranches is the difference between their numerical 
ratings minus 1, i.e. the number of missing notches between the two tranches The rating gap 
between the two highest rated tranches is indexed by i = 1, the rating gap between the second 
and third best rated tranches is indexed i = 2 and so on. Rating gaps are attached a higher 
weight (i/∑i), the lower are the ratings of the adjacent tranches. The rating asymmetry 
measure is 0 when the rating gaps are the same for tranches with high and low ratings. The 
measure is positive when the rating gaps are larger between tranches with low ratings. In our 
sample the rating asymmetry measure has a mean of 0.087, a standard deviation of 0.20, a 
minimum of -1/3and a maximum of 1.17. This indicates that rating gaps tend to be stronger 
between tranches with lower ratings, i.e. ratings are clustered more in the higher rating range. 
Possibly a more differentiated tranching does not pay in the range of lower ratings because 
investors buying these tranches are more sophisticated and do not rely much on ratings. 
Another potential explanation might be that tranche sizes tend to be smaller in the range of 
low ratings so that it does not pay to split a small tranche. Therefore we next look at the 
tranche sizes (Table 5).  
 
- Table 5 - 
 
In true sale transactions the average size of the Aaa-tranche is large. It declines from 81% for 
single-tranche deals to 68% for deals with 6 rated tranches, with an average of about 76 %. In 
synthetic deals the average size of the Aaa-tranche varies between 3 % for single-tranche 
deals and 5 % for deals with 3 or 4 tranches, with an average of about 4.5 %. Thus, 
Hypothesis 3 is clearly supported. The small average size of Aaa-tranches in synthetic deals 
can be understood better in relation to the non-securitized super-senior tranche (Third Loss 
Position) which is on average about 87 % (excluding 3 atypical fully funded synthetic 
transactions). Adding this and the average size of the Aaa-tranche yields 91.5 % for synthetic 
deals. Hence the attachment point of Aaa-tranches is about 15 % higher in synthetic than in 
true sale transactions. This is due to the better quality of the asset pools in synthetic deals. The 
quality difference materializes also in the sizes of the FLPs. The average size of the FLP is 
about 8.7 % in true sale and 3.3 % in synthetic transactions. The aggregate size of all rated 
non-Aaa-tranches is 100 – 8.7 – 76 = 15.3 % in true sale transactions, but only 100 – 3.3 - 87- 
4.5 = 5.2 % in synthetic transactions. This explains why the average sizes of the non-AAa-
tranches tend to be much smaller in synthetic deals. For true sale transactions, Table 5 shows 
several examples of average tranche sizes above 10 % in the A-range, but for synthetic 
transactions there is only one example for single tranche-deals. 
  - 19 -The average size of tranches below A3 is small. In most transactions, the size of a tranche 
tends to decline with its rating. But the originator cannot choose the tranche sizes arbitrarily 
because they are constrained through the default probabilities resp. the expected losses as 
defined by the rating agencies. As an example
8 demonstrates, the tranche size does not 
decline monotonically with the tranche rating. Also, if two tranches with adjacent ratings are 
merged, then the merged tranche is rather thick. In our transaction sample, within a 
transaction the size of a tranche is larger than that of the adjacent lower rated tranche in about 
75 % and smaller in about 25 % of the cases. Surprisingly, in synthetic transactions we 
observe rather thin tranches with a rating below Ba3, which are absent in true sale-
transactions. Possibly there is more investor demand for low rated tranches in high quality 
s. Berndt et al (2005) also find a rather strong 
verlap of credit spreads for corporate bonds.  
- Figure 1 - 
eristics are largely unknown for 
s  
pital ratio,  
s,  
4 to 2004, and the standard deviation of these returns as a proxy for 
synthetic transactions. 
A puzzling finding relates to the initial credit spreads of rated tranches. Within a transaction, 
the credit spread always increases from one tranche to the adjacent tranche with a lower 
rating. Fig. 1 plots the credit spreads of all rated tranches for all transactions on a logarithmic 
scale, differentiated with respect to the issuance quarter. For tractability, Fig. 1 differentiates 
only among the rating classes Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba and B. Although the black dots for the A-
related ratings are mostly below those for the B-related ratings, there is surprisingly much 
overlap in several issuance quarters. These overlaps neither can be explained by variations 




4.2 Regression  results 
Next we run regressions to test the hypotheses stated before. In all regressions we control for 
originator characteristics which may affect credit spreads and tranching decisions. We 
distinguish banks and investment firms as originators and include various characteristics of 
originating banks in our empirical analysis. These charact
investment firms. In the regressions we include as control
-  the tier 1-capital ratio and the total ca
-  capital structure: equity/total asset
-  asset structure: loans/total assets, 
-  profitability: return on average equity capital in the transaction year, average return 
over the years 199
profitability risk, 
  - 20 --  Tobin´s Q to proxy for the bank´s profitability and also for its growth potential, 
-  the bank´s rating. Rating is captured by an integer variable which equals 1 for a Aaa-
rating and increases by 1 for every notch, with 16 for a rating of B3. A higher integer 
d in the 
llowing sections, insignificant regressors are mostly excluded and, thus, not shown. 
d the loans/assets ratio have some explanatory power and therefore are 
ed. We find 
   .19   + 9.6   - .19   + .58   -.70   -.04   equ  + .02  sets 
sactions. This is not 
indicates a lower rating. 
These bank data are obtained from the Bank Scope Database. As these data are not available 
for investment firms, we subtract from each bank control variable its average to eliminate 
effects of averages. The standardized bank control variable then is multiplied by a dummy 
which is 1 for a bank being the originator and 0 otherwise. In the regressions, reporte
fo
 
4.2.1  The Number of Tranches 
The first regression is a probit regression explaining the number of tranches in a transaction 
by several characteristics of the transaction and of the originator. For banks, the average 
return on equity an
includ
         
Number of tranches = 
WADP 1/ln ADS FLP ln vol CBO return on ity loans/as   
   (0.0000)        (0.0377)       (0.0002)     (0.0004 )    (0.0101)   (0.0353)         (0.0068) 
 
                                                                                                                       Pseudo-R
2 = 0.238 
 
The regression coefficients are shown together with their p-values (in parentheses). The 
regression is based on the 92 transactions for which we can derive the adjusted diversity score 
(ADS), based on asset correlations ρint = 20 and ρex = 2 percent. FLP is the size of the FLP, 
defined as a fraction of the transaction volume. Vol is the €-volume of the transaction. CBO is 
a dummy which is 1 for a CBO-transaction and 0 otherwise. The regression indicates that the 
number of tranches is inversely related to the portfolio quality as stated in Hypothesis 2a. Not 
surprisingly, the FLP-size has a negative impact on the number of tranches because a larger 
FLP reduces the space for rated tranches. The positive impact of the transaction volume on 
the number of tranches clearly supports Hypothesis 2b. The negative sign of the CBO-dummy 
indicates that the number of tranches tends to be smaller in CBO-tran
surprising since 13 out of 14 single tranche-deals are CBO-transactions. 
While the regression coefficient of WADP is stable in various regressions, the regression 
coefficient of 1/ln ADS depends on the regressors included. The regression coefficient for 1/ln 
ADS is positive even though the correlation coefficient between the number of tranches and ln 
ADS is 0.31.This sign reversal is intuitive since well diversified asset pools tend to have a 
  - 21 -high transaction volume and a small FLP, both suggesting a high number of tranches. 
Controlling for transaction volume and FLP reveals a negative impact of asset pool 
sion is quite limited, however. If we exclude them, the pseudo-R
2 
ecreases to 0.201.  
read is equivalent to 
inimizing the annual risk premium paid on all rated tranches (ARP).  
han 
diversification on the number of tranches. 
Only two originator characteristics have a significant impact on the number of tranches. For 
banks as originators, a lower return of equity and a higher loan to assets ratio tend to raise the 
number of tranches. The positive impact of the loans to assets-ratio might indicate more 
securitization activity of the originating bank and, thus, a need for a broader investor base; 
this might be easier to attract through more differentiated tranches. A lower return on equity 
might also intensify a bank´s securitization activities to raise bank profits quickly as found by 
Titman/Tsyplakov (2010). The impact of these originator characteristics on the explanatory 
power of the regres
d
 
4.2.2  Annual Risk Premium of Transactions  
Next, we analyse the risk premiums on all rated tranches in a transaction. The originator of a 
transaction is interested in minimizing her transaction cost and the credit spreads on the rated 
tranches, given the asset pool quality and the FLP. The weighted average spread of all 
tranches should be inversely related to the number of differently rated tranches (Hypothesis 
1). Given the loss rate distribution of the asset pool, the FLP, and, in a synthetic transaction, 
the Third Loss Position, minimizing the weighted average credit sp
m
 
As Moody´s does not publish expected tranche losses, we need to estimate them. The rating 
agencies use multi-period simulation models to derive the loss rate distribution of the asset 
pool. These models produce uni-modal loss rate distributions. Given the strong impact of 
rating agencies in securitization, we also use a uni-modal distribution. This may be dangerous. 
Longstaff/Rajan (2008) analysed the loss rate distribution of CDX-tranches and find a three-
modal loss rate distribution where the second (third) mode has a much smaller density t
the first (second). The modes might be attributable to different default clustering factors.  
From Moody´s we know for each transaction the weighted average default probability 
(WADP) of the asset pool and its diversity score (DS) and, for a restricted sample, the more 
refined adjusted diversity score (ADS). This allows us to use a two-parameter distribution. As 
in Franke, Herrmann and Weber (2008), we assume that the loss rate distribution can be 
reasonably approximated by a lognormal distribution
9. Also Moody´s (2000) used this 
  - 22 -distribution. The two parameters of this distribution are inferred from WADP and ADS as 
explained in Appendix 1. The lognormal distribution approximates the distribution, obtained 
from the simulation models of the rating agencies, reasonably well. This approximation 
allows us to use the Black-Scholes framework, and hence, to use analytic expressions for the 
expected tranche losses and the share of expected default losses of the asset pool borne by the 
nches is 32 bp. The large Aaa-
anche strongly pulls down the ARP in true sale-transactions.  
 
- Table 6 - 
 a lower diversity score should also raise ARP. 
the loss share varies only little across transactions 
FLP. This share is called the FLP-loss share.  
Table 6 shows the regression results. Regressions are based on 37 true sale- and 45 synthetic 
observations. We have assigned the atypical 3 fully funded synthetic Geldilux-transactions to 
the true sale-sample. We distinguish true sale and synthetic transactions because the average 
ARP for true sale transactions is 39 basis points while it is 102 bp for synthetic transactions. 
This difference is due to the large non-sold super-senior portion in synthetic transactions 
which is not included in ARP. In true sale-transactions the large Aaa-tranches earn an average 
credit spread of 35 basis points, but they bear an annual expected loss per € invested of only 
2.5 basis points. Hence the annual risk premium on the Aaa-tra
tr
 
The first regression shows that in true sale-transactions the annual weighted average risk 
premium ARP increases with WADP. This supports the loss volume effect stated in 
Hypothesis 4a. A higher WADP imposes more default losses on investors (see also Krahnen 
and Wilde (2008)) and, hence, they charge a higher risk premium. A higher WADP is also 
associated with stronger information asymmetry which should also raise ARP, consistent with 
Hypothesis 5. According to this hypothesis,
But this is not supported by the regressions.  
To account for different conditions in credit markets, we include the IBOXX-spread at the 
issuance date as a regressor. This spread is the difference between the BBB- and the 
government credit spreads for a maturity between 3 and 5 years. Not surprisingly, a higher 
IBOXX-spread raises ARP. More importantly, a higher number of rated tranches lowers ARP, 
supporting Hypothesis 1. Issuing more tranches allows the originator to better signal the asset 
pool quality and to better exploit heterogeneous investor preferences. One might expect also a 
negative influence of the FLP-loss share. But this variable has no significant impact. This may 
be due to the observation that 
(Franke/Herrmann/Weber (2008)). 
  - 23 -The second regression indicates that a higher rating asymmetry measure tends to lower ARP. 
This measure is higher in a transaction where the tranche ratings are clustered more in the 
high rating range. This tends to reduce the weighted average credit. This finding supports the 
conjecture that tranche ratings clustered in the low rating range have less impact on ARP 
because investors buying these tranches are more sophisticated and, therefore, rely less on 
nificant in synthetic 
ansactions. The negative coefficient indicates that investors may prefer highly diversified 
metry (Hypothesis 5). 
 transactions, we run regressions on 
ative risk premiums of most tranches, and hence RRP. Similarly, 
ratings and more on their own analysis. Originator characteristics do not play a significant 
role. 
Regressions (3) and (4) in Table 6 analyse ARP for synthetic transactions. Again, a higher 
number of rated tranches and a higher rating asymmetry measure lower ARP, supporting 
Hypothesis 1. Surprisingly, regression (3) shows a negative regression coefficient of WADP, 
significant at the 5%-level. When we include in regression (4) the number of tranches and the 
rating asymmetry measure, the coefficient of WADP is no longer significant. Hence the 
puzzling sign of the WADP-coefficient in regression (3) may be driven by tranching effects. 
Also in synthetic transactions WADPs are, on average, quite small and have small standard 
deviations (Table 2). Therefore, WADPs may convey little information to investors in 
synthetic transactions. Adjusted diversity scores, however, are sig
tr
transactions because of smaller information asym
 
4.2.3  Relative Risk premiums of Transactions 
To analyse pricing kernel effects, we first study the relative risk premium of all rated tranches 
in a transaction, RRP. It is defined as ARP, divided by the annualised expected loss borne by 
all rated tranches. Since the RRP is 7.8 for synthetic transactions and 27.5 for true sale-
transactions, due to the expensive Aaa-tranche in true sale
RRP first separately for true sale and synthetic transactions, then jointly for all transactions. 
The results are shown in regressions (5) to (8) in Table 6. 
In all these regressions WADP and ADS have a clearly negative impact on the RRP as 
suugested by the pricing kernel effect. As stated in Hypothesis 6 b), an increase in WADP 
should reduce the rel
Hypothesis 6 c) predicts a negative effect of the diversity score. Hence, these regressions 
support Hypothesis 6. 
The FLP-loss share has a significant positive impact on RRP in all four regressions. A higher 
loss share suggests a higher attachment point for the lowest rated tranche which, by a pricing 
kernel effect, should raise RRP (Hypothesis 6 a). But a higher loss share also supports 
  - 24 -investor confidence and thus should lower RRP (Hypothesis 5). Apparently, the pricing kernel 
effect dominates. As expected, the IBOXX-spread has a positive impact on RRP. A higher 
ith a higher total capital ratio and lower 
his indicates that the pricing of risk transfer in securitizations follows a common 
gic making it difficult to earn arbitrage profits by trading securitization tranches against 
remiums is even smaller because tranche characteristics play a more important role. 
number of rated tranches has a clearly negative impact on RRP only in regressions (6) and 
(7), as claimed in Hypothesis 1. 
Including the synthetic dummy in the last regression renders the number of tranches 
insignificant. The synthetic dummy has a strongly negative impact on RRP. By the pricing 
kernel effect, the better quality of asset pools in synthetic transactions suggests a higher RRP, 
but the exclusion of the non-securitized super-senior tranche suggests a lower RRP. Also, the 
better quality of the asset pool suggests a lower RRP due to less information asymmetry. 
Apparently, the latter two effects dominate. Regressions (5) - (8) suggest that a higher number 
of tranches has a significant impact on RRP only in synthetic transactions. Finally, originator 
characteristics are mostly irrelevant. But a bank w
return variability pays a smaller RRP. Investors may have more confidence in an originator 
with better capitalization and less profitability risk. 
It is worth noting that the adjusted R²s are much higher for the RRP- than for the ARP-
regressions. T
lo
each other.  
 
4.2.4  Risk Premiums of Individual Tranches 
So far, we analysed risk premiums on all rated tranches of a transaction. Next, we analyse the 
annual and the relative risk premiums of individual rated tranches. There are 4 tranches with 
an annual risk premium below -1 %. We exclude these tranches because of potential data 
errors. Since most transactions have more than one tranche, the residuals of tranches 
belonging to one transaction might be clustered. Therefore the p-values are estimated using a 
clustered residual robust variance matrix
10. Originator characteristics play a small role in risk 
premiums of all rated tranches as shown above. Their effect on individual tranche risk 
p
Therefore originator characteristics do not show up as regressors in the following regressions.  
 
First, we run OLS-regressions to explain the annual tranche risk premium (ATRP). In the first 
regression of Table 7, WADP/maturity, a proxy for the annual expected portfolio loss, has a 
significant, positive impact on ATRP, supporting a loss volume effect (Hypothesis 4). This is 
also consistent with an information asymmetry effect (Hypothesis 5). But asset pool 
  - 25 -diversification measured by the adjusted diversity score has no impact. The loss volume effect 
is supported by the FLP-impact. Since an increase in WADP/maturity raises the FLP in a 
linear regression with the coefficient 2.72, we use (FLP - 2.72 WADP/maturity) as a 
regressor. Its negative coefficient indicates that a higher FLP takes away more default losses 
from the rated tranches and therefore reduces ATRP. Also, a higher number of subordinated 
rated tranches reduces ATRP. More subordinated tranches signal a higher attachment point 
and, thus, a smaller expected tranche loss which should reduce the annual tranche risk 
premium (Hypothesis 4 a). Also more subordinated tranches may provide more information 
about the tranche risk which should reduce risk premiums. Consistent with this finding is the 
strong additional risk premium for the lowest rated tranche as shown by the positive 
regression coefficient for the lowest rated tranche-dummy. This tranche is particularly risky, it 
is the most information-sensitive rated tranche, also managing its risk is most complex (see 
also Weber 2008). Surprisingly, the number of subordinated tranches adds more to the 
xplanatory power of the regression than the attachment point. As expected, the IBOXX-
spread has a positive impact on the tranch . 
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Next we ask whether the annual tranche risk premium can be better explained by the tranche 
rating than by the observable economic properties used in regression (1). As shown in 
regression (2), substituting tranche rating for economic tranche properties slightly increases 
the explanatory power of the regression from 39.1 to 42.6 %. This supports the strong impact 
of ratings and, thus, Hypothesis 7. Yet, the R²
blindly trust ratings, but also evaluate other tranche properties. Tranche size and originator 
characteristics do not help explaining ATRP.  
While the annual tranche risk premium appears to be driven primarily by volume and pricing 
kernel effects, the relative risk premium of a tranche (RTRP) should be driven primarily by 
pricing kernel effects. To check for this, consider first the average RTRP for different ratings 
classes. Senior tranches generate losses primarily in the “expensive” macro-states and 
therefore should pay a high risk premium per unit of expected loss. This should be 
particularly true for the thick Aaa-tranches in true sale transactions, not so much for the thin 
Aaa-tranches in synthetic transactions. This conjecture is strongly supported by the following 
table which shows the average relative risk premia for different rating classes in our sample. 
Since the estimation of the very small expected loss of the Aaa-tranche is subject to stro
  - 26 -estimation error implying a very strong effect on the relative risk premium, we winsorize the 
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risk premium of 200 to a nches her value. 
rating class  TS A SYN A Aa an Baa  Ba an
Average rel  47.7 20.39  7.97 5.22 3.31 
RP  
 
The relative risk premiums shown in the table are in line with the spread ratios for corporate 
bonds derived by Amato/Remolona (2003). The pricing kernel effect clearly dominates the 




which should reduce their relative risk premiums. 
 
Regressions (3) to (6) in Table 7 display our findings on the relative risk premiums of 
individual tranches. Since WADP and the attachment point are strongly correlated, we regress 
on WADP and on (WADP – 0.424 attachment point) with 0.424 being the coefficient of the 
attachment point on WADP in a linear regression. As a primer, the R² of regression (3) is 77% 
which is surprisingly high. This indicates that the pricing of securitization tranches is more 
homogeneous than suggested by Fig. 1. The attachment point has a clearly positive impact on 
RTRP, supporting Hypothesis 6 a). The regression coefficient of WADP is negative, in lin
with Hypothesis 6 b) for lower rated tranches. We will see, however, that this result needs to 
be differentiated for rating classes. The IBOXX spread has a positive impact as usual.  
The dummy “TS-Aaa”, being 1 for the Aaa-tranche in true sale transactions and 0 otherwise, 
has a very strong impact on the RTRP. The Aaa-tranche carries a very high RTRP. This is not 
surprising, given the very high relative risk premium of 47.7 shown in the previous table. The 
dummy “lowest” also has a strong positive regression coefficient indicating a complexity 
premium for the lowest rated tranche. Regression (4) in Table 7 excludes 
tranches, otherwise being the same. The R² strongly goes down from 77 to 48.6%. This 
illustrates the strong effect of the true sale-Aaa-tranches on regression results. 
Again, we check the explanatory power of ratings by substituting the tranche rating for 
WADP and attachment point. Since rating agencies do not care about pricing kernel effects, 
ratings should do a poor job in explaining relative risk premiums of tranches. Regression (5), 
which includes true sale Aaa-tranches, shows that the substitution clearly reduces the 
explanatory power from 77 to 57.9 %. The regression coefficient of the tranche rating is 
  - 27 -negative as expected. The dummies for the true sale-Aaa-tranche and the lowest rated tranche 
remain significant. In regression (6), we exclude the true sale Aaa-tranches. The decline of R² 
from 48.6 to 10.1 % is dramatic. This confirms that ratings ignore pricing kernel effects. Yet, 
ndings indicate that investors rely less on ratings and more on economic tranche 
roperties. The observed tranche pricing is consistent with pricing kernel effects predicted by 
nly between the attachment and the 
ingent default loss if both tranches have a small size. 
the rating coefficient remains strongly significant. This is in line with Hypothesis 6 a), since a 
better rating indicates a higher attachment point. 
The minor importance of ratings in explaining relative risk premiums of tranches is also 
supported by another regression excluding true sale-Aaa-tranches (not shown). If we add the 





4.2.5  Relative Risk Premia of Butterfly Spreads 
The previous findings for the relative risk premiums of tranches document a positive 
attachment point effect as well as a positive impact of the tranche rating. This suggests that 
the stochastic discount factor increases with the aggregate default rate. It is, however, also 
possible that the pricing kernel is flat over a large range of aggregate default rates and only 
increases in the range of high rates. The findings for the relative risk premiums of tranches 
would be similar because the tranche losses occur not o
detachment point of the tranche, but more so in the range of very high loss rates of the asset 
pool, i.e. in the range of very “expensive” macro-states.  
To obtain a more precise picture of the pricing kernel, we check the relative risk premiums of 
butterfly spreads. Consider two adjacent tranches i and (i+1) in a transaction with sizes si and 
si+1  and tranche i having the better rating. A butterfly spread is a portfolio of investing 1 € in 
tranche (i+1) and selling short si+1/ si € of the better rated tranche i. The butterfly spread 
generates triangular default losses for a portfolio loss rate between the attachment point of 
tranche (i+1) and the detachment point of tranche i. Otherwise the payoff of the spread is 
zero. The loss of the butterfly spread is highest at the attachment point of tranche i. Hence a 
butterfly spread is similar to a state-cont
Thus, butterfly spreads should reveal pricing kernel effects more clearly than tranches with 
default losses in a wide range of states.  
15 (14) out of 78 (90) butterfly spreads in true sale- (synthetic) transactions have a negative 
relative risk premium. This is to be expected whenever the (forward) stochastic discount 
factor is mostly below 1 in the range between the attachment and the detachment point of the 
  - 28 -butterfly spread. We would expect that for butterfly spreads with low attachment points. An 
exception might be the butterfly spreads including the lowest rated tranche because this 
tranche is expensive as shown before. But negative relative risk premiums might also indicate 
a puzzle similar to that in option pricing discovered by Jackwerth (2000) and later confirmed 
by  Rosenberg/Engle (2002) as well as Barone-Adesi et al (2008). The puzzle is that the 
aggregate relative risk aversion implicit in option prices appears to be negative in some 
reads in true sale-transactions which 
cludes the large Aaa-tranche. For these the relative risk premium tends to be higher. This is 
also confirmed in the regressions reported in Table 8. 
 asymmetry as stated in Hypothesis 5 rather than an attachment point effect. This 
moneyness-range. A similar phenomenon might explain negative relative risk premiums of 
some butterfly spreads in securitizations. 
Plotting the residual from a regression of the relative risk premiums of butterfly spreads 
(RRPBS) against the attachment points of the butterfly spreads reveals no systematic pattern, 
with the exception of the most senior butterfly sp
in
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Regression (1) in Table 8 shows the determinants of the relative risk premiums for butterfly 
spreads in synthetic  transactions. The attachment point of the butterfly spread has no 
significant effect. The dummy lowest equals 1 for the butterfly spread with the lowest 
attachment point within a transaction and 0 otherwise. Its regression coefficient of 1.508 
indicates a complexity premium for this butterfly spread, but it is insignificant, in contrast to 
the findings for the lowest rated tranche. Besides of the IBOXX-spread, WADP and ADS have 
strong negative effects, supporting Hypothesis 6 b) and c). The ADS-effect may be driven by 
information
is likely since the attachment point effect is insignificant even in the absence of the ADS-
regressor.  
For true sale-transactions, log ADS turns out to be insignificant (regression (2)). But the 
attachment point effect is positive and strongly significant, as expected. This finding 
disappears, however, if we exclude the most senior butterfly spread of each transaction. In 
regression (3) the attachment point effect is clearly insignificant. This indicates that the 
pricing kernel is flat in the range of asset pool loss rates below the attachment points of Aaa-
tranches and strongly increases above these points. A much higher R² can be obtained by 
substituting log ADS for the negatively correlated attachment point (regression (4)). The 
stronger effect of ADS on R² may be due to an information asymmetry effect, related to ADS. 
  - 29 -These findings correspond to those in regression (1) for synthetic transactions. Overall, these 
results indicate that the attachment point effect disappears if we exclude the most senior 
utterfly spreads. The pricing kernel appears to be rather flat in a wide range of asset pool loss 
 Baa, 
a and B. We use a dummy variable which is 1 if the tranche has a specific rating and 0 
values in parentheses) 
                -32.0 D(Baa)          WADP                            (0.0002) 
             -4.74 D(Baa) ln ADS                                    (0.0112) 




4.3  Checks and Robustness Tests 
4.3.1  Relative Risk Premia and Ratings of Tranches 
In the following, we check our findings by additional regressions and by robustness tests. 
First, since a better rating tends to be associated with a higher attachment point, we also check 
for the attachment point effect by analysing the impact of WADP and ADS on the relative 
risk premiums of tranches separately for each rating class. Besides of the Aaa-tranches in true 
sale- and synthetic transactions, we do not differentiate within the rating classes Aa, A,
B
otherwise. In an OLS–regression we find for 301 observations (p-
 
Rel RP =   82.1                                                                (0.0000) 
                  349 D(TS Aaa)      WADP                            (0.0050) 
                  375 D(SYN Aaa)   WADP                            (0.0652) 
                  -21.5 D(Aa and A) WADP                            (0.3534) 
  
                  -24.9 D(Ba and B)  WADP                           (0.0000) 
 
                  22.8 D(TS Aaa) ln ADS                                (0.0000) 
                  -5.01 D(SYN Aaa) ln ADS                           (0.0603) 
                  -3.86 D(Aa and A) ln ADS                           (0.0477) 
     
                  -5.40 D(Ba
    
            Adj   R² = .58 
These results corroborate our finding that Aaa-tranches are special. A higher WADP tends to 
raise the relative risk premium of a Aaa-tranche, but to lower that of a lower rated tranche. 
This supports Hypothesis 6b). While a higher WADP appears to lower the relative risk 
premium of the asset pool, it raises the attachment point of a tranche concentrating default 
losses in the more expensive macro-states. If the pricing kernel increases weakly with the 
  - 30 -aggregate default rate in the range of low aggregate default rates, but strongly in the range of 
high rates, then the relative risk premium of a tranche with a weak (strong) rating should 
ale-transactions. A possible explanation for this exception 
ight be that a higher diversity score concentrates default losses of the Aaa-tranches in the 
ariably 
Replacing ρex = 2 by ρex = 4 sometimes raises and 
decline (increase) with WADP. These findings are consistent with those derived from 
butterfly-spreads.  
A stronger asset pool diversification should lower the relative risk premium of all tranches 
because it may reduce information asymmetry (Hypothesis 5) and lower the attachment point 
of a tranche (Hypothesis 6c). This ADS-effect is supported by the regression, with the 
exception of Aaa-tranches in true s
m
very expensive macro-states. 
 
4.3.2  Different Measures of Diversification 
One controversial issue is the correlation between debtor defaults in an asset pool. Therefore 
we check our findings by using different diversity scores. So far, we used the adjusted 
diversity score based on an asset correlation of debtors within the same industry of 20 percent 
and of debtors in different industries of 2 percent. First, we replace the adjusted diversity 
score by Moody´s traditional diversity score which ignores correlations of debtors in different 
industries. But this should be viewed with caution because the allocation of default losses to 
individual tranches reacts quite sensitively to the input parameters (Duffie/ Garleanu (2001)). 
The difference between the adjusted diversity score and the diversity score can be quite large. 
While the diversity score has a mean of 63.6 in all 167 transactions, the mean adjusted 
diversity score in the subset of 92 transactions is 25.3. This suggests that the adjusted 
diversity score is less than half the diversity score. For the 92 transactions, the average of the 
difference (0.5 diversity score - adjusted diversity score) is 12.3, the difference is above 40 for 
8 transactions. Therefore it would be surprising if regressions based on 0.5 diversity score 
would provide answers similar to those obtained with the adjusted diversity score. This 
conjecture is verified. Even though the number of observations almost doubles when we use 
0.5 diversity score instead of the adjusted diversity score, the adjusted R² almost inv
goes down, sometimes dramatically. Also in many cases the coefficients of regressors which 
are significant in our previous regressions, show higher p-values or lose significance.  
In addition, we run the regressions with the adjusted diversity score based on asset 
correlations of ρex = 0 or 4 percent for debtors in different industries. The significance of the 
regressors changes little when we replace ρex = 2 by ρex = 0 or 4. But the adjusted R² s are 
clearly smaller for  ρex = 0 than for  ρex = 2. 
  - 31 -sometimes lowers the adjusted R². This suggests that a range between 2 and 4 percent was 
fication does 
nd, hence, the relative risk premiums derived for 
aa-tranches.  Duffie et al (2009) argue that most models miss unobservable default risk 
isk. 
ays turns out to be insignificant; therefore we do not report it in 
ur regressions. The difference between true sale and synthetic transactions, however, is 
important as shown before. 
 
considered realistic by market participants. 
4.3.3  The Impact of Diversification Across Industries 
Our findings on the pricing of tranches depend on the underlying assumptions, in particular 
on approximating the asset pool loss rate distribution by a lognormal distribution. Many 
papers use more sophisticated distributions like Levy-distributions, based on more 
complicated default factor structures. But we cannot obtain the information required for more 
sophisticated distributions from the offering circulars and other available documents. Also, 
the simulation models used by the rating agencies generate loss rate distributions which are 
reasonably approximated by a lognormal distribution. To check for default clustering effects 
found by Longstaff/Rajan (2008), we include the regressor (1/ADS 4- 1/ADS0) with ADS4 
based on ρex = 4 and ADS0 based on ρex = 0 percent. Given an asset pool with equally sized 
loans, m industries and the same number of loans in each industry, (1/ADS 4- 1/ADS0) = 0.04 
(1- 1/m) (see Fender/Kiff (2004)). Hence it would monotonically increase in the 
diversification of the asset pool across industries. This regressor turns out to have no 
significant impact on risk premiums in our sample. Hence, interindustry diversi
not seem to have an impact on tranche pricing beyond what is captured in the adjusted 
diversity score. In that sense, we do not find evidence of priced industry factors. 
 In all loss rate models, however, the upper tail reacts very sensitively to the parameter input. 
It is difficult to reliably estimate the loss rate distribution for loss rates much beyond the 
expected portfolio loss rate because the density approaches zero in this range. This casts 
doubt, in particular, on the expected losses a
A
factors which imply a much higher tail r
 
4.3.4  CBO-versus CLO-Transactions 
Another issue might be our joint analysis of CLO- and CBO-transactions. 
Franke/Herrmann/Weber (2008) found that the FLP-loss shares tend to be higher in CBO- 
than in CLO-transactions. In our regressions, we check for potential differences between 
CLO- and CBO-transactions by including a dummy which is 1 for CBO-transactions and 0 
otherwise. This dummy alw
o
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The impact of originator characteristics on our findings is very limited. These characteristics 
are apparently of little concern to investors and rating agencies. This suggests that tranching 
and pricing depend mainly on transaction characteristics. We cannot rule out that the 
originator chooses these characteristics taking into consideration their impact on tranching 
and pricing. But this potential endogeneity is of little concern because we try to find out the 
effects of transaction characteristics on tranching and pricing. Thus, we take the transaction 
characteristics as exogenous. We account for interdependencies betweeen them by avoiding 
strongly correlated regressors or by using regressors adjusted for linear dependencies. 
 
5 Conclusion 
This paper analyses the tranching and pricing of securitized pools of corporate bonds and 
loans, using a sample of European securitizations. The number of issued bond tranches with 
different ratings varies between 1 and 6. 88 percent of the transactions have at least one Aaa-
tranche, about 14 percent of the tranches are subinvestment grade. Given a transaction with at 
least three differently rated tranches, tranche ratings tend to be clustered more in the good 
rating classes. Since credit spreads of Aaa-tranches are lower than those of lower rated 
tranches, the originator issues very large Aaa-tranches in true sale-transactions. In synthetic 
transactions the originator cannot use the funds from issuing bond tranches. As the transfer of 
default losses through Aaa-tranches is expensive, we observe very small Aaa-tranches and 
large non-securitized super-senior tranches in synthetic transactions.  
The number of tranches tends to be higher for larger asset pools and for those with lower 
quality. More tranches provide more signals about asset pool quality and permit the originator 
to extract more investor rents. In line with this, the annual risk premium paid on all rated 
tranches tends to decline if the number of tranches increases. This is also true of the relative 
risk premium on all rated tranches, i.e. the average price for transferring one unit of expected 
default loss. 
The annual risk premium, paid on all rated tranches in a transaction, increases with the 
expected default loss of the asset pool in true sale-transactions, presumably because a larger 
volume of losses is transferred. For synthetic transactions, the expected default loss has no 
systematic effect when we include the positively correlated number of tranches. The relative 
risk premium, paid on all rated tranches in a transaction, declines with a higher expected loss 
of the asset pool, in line with a pricing kernel effect. Apparently this effect dominates the 
opposite information asymmetry effect. A higher FLP-loss share raises the relative risk 
  - 33 -premium on all rated tranches, again indicating the dominance of the pricing kernel over the 
information asymmetry effect.  
Our findings for the annual and the relative risk premiums of individual tranches mostly 
confirm the results obtained for all rated tranches in a transaction. A decline in asset pool 
quality should reinforce information asymmetry and, thus, raise the risk premium, while the 
pricing kernel effect should lower it. The relative strength of theses effects appears to vary 
across tranches. The lowest rated tranche earns a higher risk premium indicating a complexity 
premium, perhaps because this tranche is very information-sensitive and very risky. The 
relative risk premium tends to increase with a better tranche rating. It is very high for Aaa-
tranches in true sale–transactions, consistent with a pricing kernel effect even though this 
tranche is very information-insensitive. Therefore it seems to be very expensive to transfer 
losses through a Aaa-tranche. This may explain the large number of synthetic transactions 
with a small Aaa-tranche.  
The analysis of individual tranches is complicated by the fact that their attachment and 
detachment points depend on the quality of the asset pool. The relative risk premiums of 
butterfly-spreads which are obtained from two adjacent tranches, provide a more precise 
picture of the pricing kernel. We find that the attachment point of a butterfly spread has 
almost no effect on the relative risk premium except for the most senior butterfly spread. This 
suggests that the pricing kernel may be rather flat below the attachment points of the Aaa-
tranches, but increases strongly with the loss rates of asset pools beyond these points.  
The finding that tranche ratings have very little power explaining the relative risk premiums 
of non-Aaa-tranches, confirms that ratings ignore pricing kernel effects. Yet the economic 
properties of tranches explain their relative risk premiums reasonably well. This indicates that 
investors do not blindly rely on ratings, but adjust required credit spreads for pricing kernel 
and information asymmetry considerations. 
This paper is a first step to better understand tranching and pricing in securitizations. More 
research is needed. The paper uses particular measures of expected losses and diversification 
of asset pools and postulates a lognormal loss rate distribution. It is necessary to check the 
sensitivity of findings to the model setup in further studies. Also, the findings are based on a 
European sample of securitization transactions and might differ for US-transactions. 
Moreover, we need to better understand the interdependence between the pricing kernels in 
credit and in stock markets. Since tranching is often considered a driver of the subprime 
crisis, new insights on tranching may also be helpful in improving regulation of securitization 
transactions.  
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1. The Parameters of the Lognormal Loss Rate Distribution 
We estimate the portfolio loss rate distribution assuming a lognormal distribution. We 
simplify the analysis by a two date-analysis so that all default losses occur at date 1. Hence 
we ignore that in these transactions payments are usually made on a quarterly basis. 
The expected portfolio loss rate equals  ( ) π λ = l E  with 
π  = WADP,  
λ  =  loss given default, assumed to be non-random.  
Hence we need to know the standard deviation of the loss rate of the asset pool to obtain the 
parameters of the lognormal distribution. Let denote 
S = standard deviation of the loan loss rate , 
( l ln ) σ σ =  = standard deviation of the lognormally distributed asset pool loss rate,  
μ  =  expectation of the lognormally distributed asset pool loss rate,  () l E ln = μ , 
i P  =  par value of loan i, divided by the par value of all loans; i = 1,…, n, 
j i ρ  =  asset correlation between loan i and loan j. 
Assuming identical default properties of all loans, the variance of the loan loss rate is 
() ( ) ( ) π λπ λ π λπ
2 2 1 0 ² − + − − = S ( ) 2 1 λ π π − = .                                                                
Then the variance of the asset pool loss rate is 
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The latter part of the equation follows from the definition of the adjusted diversity score. It is 
the number of equally sized loans whose defaults are uncorrelated which generates the same 
variance of the asset pool loss rate. 
For a lognormally distributed asset pool loss rate,  
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2.  Expected Default Losses of Tranches 
Given strict subordination of tranches, the expected default loss of a tranche with attachment 
point a and detachment point d equals  
 
 ∫a
d (l-a) dF(l) +(d-a) (1 – F(d)). 
 
F(l) is the cumulative lognormal distribution function of the portfolio loss rate l. Since the 
expected tranche loss equals the expected loss of a call with strike price a minus the expected 
loss of a call with strike price d, we derive the expected loss of the tranche analytically, as in 
the Black-Scholes world. The expected tranche loss per € invested is the expected tranche 
loss, divided by (d-a), the par value of the tranche which equals its market value at the 
issuance date. 
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∑ 80  87  167 
Table 1:  The table shows the number of transactions in the sample differentiating CLO- and 
CBO-transactions as well as true sale- and synthetic transactions.  
 
 
  CLO – ts  CLO – synth  CBO – ts  CBO – synth 
WADP – mean 









DS – mean 



















Table 2: The table presents averages and standard deviations of WADP (the weighted 
average default probability of the assets in the pool), DS (Moody’s diversity score 
of the asset pool) and FLP (the initial size of the first loss position as a percentage 
of the volume of the asset pool). The data are presented separately for the four 
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     Absolute frequencies of tranches. Total number of tranches is 594         
# tr. per 
transact. 
# 
transact. Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3  A1  A2  A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3  Ba1  Ba2  Ba3  B1  B2  B3 
1 14  6  2  2  1  1    1  1          
2  17  14  2 1 2 2 6 1    3 3             
3  47 37 8 17 8 11  10 7  5 20 6  4  6  2       
4  46 46 8 16 5  9 19  11  10  29 6  5 13 6  1     
5  37 44  10  23 3  5 23 7  7 19  12 8 16 7    1   
6  6  5 4 4 1 1 5      4 1    5 1    2 3 
∑  167  152  34  63  19 29 64  26 22 76  28 18 40  16 1  3  3 
                    
      Relative frequencies of tranches.           
# tr. per 
transact. 
# 
transact. Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3  A1  A2  A3 Baa1  Baa2 Baa3  Ba1  Ba2  Ba3  B1  B2  B3 
1  14  43  %  14%  14%  - 7%  7%    7%  7%          
2 17  82% 12%  6%  12% 12% 35%  6%    18% 18%             
3 47  79% 17% 36% 17% 23% 21% 15% 11%  43%  13% 9% 13% 4%       
4 46  100%  17% 35% 11% 20% 41% 24% 22% 63%  13% 11% 28% 13%  2%     
5 37  119%  27%  62%  8% 14%  62%  19% 19% 51%  32% 22% 43% 19%    3%   
6 6  83% 67% 67% 17% 17% 83%     67%  17%  83%  17%  33%  50% 
                            
Table 3:  In both panels, transactions in the first column are classified by the number of differently rated tranches. The second column shows the 
observed number of transactions for each class. In the upper panel the following columns show the total number of tranches in the class 
issued with the rating shown in the top line. The last line displays the total number of transactions and of tranches with a given rating; 
bold figures indicate local maxima in a line.   
The lower part of the table shows the relative frequencies of tranche ratings (= number of tranches/ number of transactions, in percent) for 
transactions with a given number of differently rated tranches. All figures greater or equal to 50 % are bold.    43
 
Number of tranches  2  3  4  5  6 
Median of rating range  6  9  10  12  15 
Median of average  
rating gap 
4 3  2  2 2 
Table 4:  It shows the median of the rating range (= 1+ difference between highest and 
lowest rating) and the median of the average rating gap for transactions, given the 
number of differently rated tranches.  
 
 Table 5:  The table displays the average tranche size separately for true sale (upper panel) and synthetic transactions (lower panel). The first 
column classifies transactions by the number of differently rated tranches, the second column shows the total number of rated tranches in 
this class in parentheses, the following columns display for each rating the average tranche size (= tranche volume/transaction volume, in 
percent), below in parentheses the number of tranches with the indicated rating. The last column gives the average size of the FLP, below 
the number of transactions in parentheses. Average tranche sizes of at least 10% are in bold numbers. The last line in each panel displays 
the number of rated tranches in parentheses as the sum of the numbers in parentheses in the respective column. In the FLP-column the 
number of true sale transactions is 80 as shown in the last line in parentheses. 
The lower panel displays the same for synthetic transactions, with the third loss position TLP (non-securitized super senior tranche) in the 
third column, below the number of transactions in parenthesis. The number of synthetic transactions is 87.  
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True Sale 
Transactions:  average  tranche  size                




tranches Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3  A1  A2  A3 Baa1  Baa2  Baa3  Ba1  Ba2  Ba3  B1 B2 B3  FLP 
1   81%    88%    68%            1 8     %
%
  (6)  (4)    (1)     (1)             (6) 
2   79%     14% 15% 10%      11%            1 0    
 (14)  (7)     (1)  (1)  (4)     (1)          (7) 
3   78% 31%    38%  6%   5%   8%   5%   3%   6%   5%   3%   2%   8%         8%  
  (65) (18)  (6) (5) (3) (6) (6) (3) (1) (9) (4) (2) (2) (1)        (22) 
4   77% 14%    13% 10%  3%   5%   10%  4%   4%   7%   1%   2%   3%         8%  
  (104) (28) (2)  (9)  (1)  (4) (12) (6)  (5) (18) (3)  (2)  (8)  (6)        (26) 
5   71%  6%   9%   2%     7%  8%   3%   5%   5%   1%   3%   2%         9% 
  (90) (22) (4) (12) (1)    (12) (5)  (1)  (9)  (8)  (2)  (8)  (6)        (18) 
6   68%  1%   7%       7%         4%       4%         9%  
  (6) (1)  (1)  (1)    (1)      (1)    (1)      (1) 
∑  (286) (80) (13) (28)  (6)  (11) (36) (14)  (7)  (37) (16)  (6)  (18) (14)        (80) 
 




 average tranche size                







Aaa  Aa1  Aa2  Aa3  A1 A2 A3  Baa1  Baa2  Baa3  Ba1 Ba2 Ba3  B1  B2  B3  FLP 
1    89%   3%  5%   17%    3%        6%      3%          6%   
  (8) (8)  (2)  (2)  (1)  (1)      (1)  (1)          (8) 
2    89%   4%  6%   4%   4%   3%   10%  1%      5%    5%           3%   
 (20)  (10)  (7)  (2)  (1)  (1)  (1)  (2)  (1)    (2)  (3)         (10) 
3    88%   5%  1%   3%   3%   3%   3%   2%   3%   2%   2%   2%   1%   1%         3%  
  (75) (25)  (19)  (2)  (12)  (5) (5) (4) (4) (4)  (11)  (2) (2) (4) (1)        (25) 
4    87%   5%  2%   3%  3%   1%   2%   2%   1%   1%   2%   1%   2%     1%       3%  
  (80) (20)  (18)  (6) (7) (4) (5) (7) (5) (5)  (11)  (3) (3) (5)    (1)      (20) 
5    86%   4%  2%   3%   1%   1%   1%   1%   2%   1%   1%   1%   1%   1%     0.5%    3%  
  (95) (19)  (22)  (6)  (11)  (2) (5)  (11)  (2) (6)  (10)  (4) (6) (8) (1)    (1)    (19) 
6    82%   4%  2%   3%   0.5%  3%   2%      2%     2%       0.5%  2%    4% 
  (30)  (5) (4) (3) (3) (1) (1) (4)      (4)      (5)      (2) (3) (5) 
∑  (308)  (87) (72) (21) (35) (13) (18) (28) (12) (15) (39) (12) (12)  (22)  (2) (1) (3) (3)  (87) 
 



















































































- - - - 
FLP- loss 
share (%) 









































- - - - - - - -1.34 
(0.0271) 
Var of return 
on equity 





Adj.  R²  0.538 0.586 0.248 0.356 0.833  0.573  0.633  0.729 
Observations  37 37 45 45 37  45 82  82 
Table 6:  The table shows the regression coefficients from OLS-regressions with Newey-
West heteroscedasticity adjusted p-values (in parentheses), explaining the annual 
risk premiums ARP and the relative risk premiums RRP of all rated tranches in a 
transaction. Rating asymmetry is the rating asymmetry measure explained above. 
FLP-loss share is the share of expected losses of the asset pool borne by the FLP. 
Spread 35 is the IBOXX-spread difference between BBB- and government bonds 
for a maturity of 3-5 years at the issue date. No. of tranches is the number of 
differently rated tranches. SYN is a dummy variable which is 1 for a synthetic 
transaction and 0 otherwise. Total capital ratio and var of return on equity are the 





































-  - - - - 




-  -   - - 
WADP  -0.424 
attachment point 
















-  - - - - 































- 0.117   
(0.000) 




Adj  R²  .391  0.426  .770 .486 .579 0.101 
Observations  298  298  298 261 298 261 
Table 7:  The table shows the regression coefficients from OLS-regressions with 
heteroscedasticity, clustered residual adjusted p-values (in parentheses) explaining 
the annual risk premiums ATRP and the relative risk premiums RTRP of individual 
tranches. RTRP + 1 equals the credit spread of the tranche, divided by its 
annualized expected loss. Attachment point is the attachment point of the tranche. 
No of sub tranches is the number of subordinated rated tranches. Spread 35 is the 
IBOXX-spread difference between BBB- and government bonds for a maturity of 
3-5 years at the issue date. Dummy TS-Aaa is 1 for a Aaa-tranche in a true sale 
transaction and 0 otherwise. Dummy lowest is 1 if the tranche is the tranche with 
the lowest rating in a transaction, and 0 otherwise. Tranche rating is captured by an 
integer variable which is 1 for Aaa and 16 for B3.  












w/o top BS 
true sale-tr. 
(3) 
RRPBS w/o top 


















Dummy lowest  1.508 
(0.1189) 
- -  - 
WADP 
(-0.54 attachment point 









Log ADS   -19.43 
(0.0000) 
- -  -19.50 
(0.0006) 








Adj  R²  0.467 0.578 0.353  0.506 
Observations  90 78 48  48 
Table 8:  The table shows OLS-regressions explaining the relative risk premiums of butterfly 
spreads in synthetic and true sale-transactions, with heteroscedasticity, clustered 
residual adjusted p-values (in parentheses). In regressions (1) and (4) WADP is a 
regressor. In regressions (2) and (3) (WADP – 0.54 attachment point) is used to 
neutralize the dependence between the attachment point and WADP as given by a 
linear regression. Dummy lowest is 1 for the butterfly spread with the lowest 
attachment point in a transaction and 0 otherwise. In regressions (3) and (4) the top 














Figure 1: It displays the credit spreads (logarithmic scale) of rated tranches across issuance quarters differentiated for the main  
rating classes.
  50
   51
                                                
Footnotes 
 
1  David (1997) asks how many tranches should be issued in a securitization transaction. 
Tranches are sold to individual and institutional investors. The latter buy tranches to hedge 
their endowment risk. Hence tranches should be differentiated so as to allow the different 
groups of investors an effective hedging.  
2  Higgins and Mason (2004) find that credit card banks provide implicit recourse to asset-
backed securities to protect their reputation. Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) document that 
banks securitizing loans have less capital than other banks and more risky assets relative to 
total assets.  
3  The benefits of quality differences between tranches derive from investor heterogeneity. 
Institutional investors may have statutes which allow them to invest in Aaa-tranches only. 
Regarding the capacity of analysing und managing default risks, investors with low 
capacity may prefer tranches with low default risk. Sophisticated investors like hedge 
funds may prefer high risk tranches. 
4  Under Basel I, the standard risk weight of 100 percent applied to all rated tranches, so that 
tranching had little impact on regulatory equity capital. But originators and investors 
anticipated capital requirements differentiated to tranche ratings according to Basel II. 
Regulators in some countries required little equity capital for the most senior tranche if it 
was insured against default risk. 
5  ∂² ln (PD(m) LGD))/∂(-∆) ∂(-m√ ρ) = [N(ym)ym + n(ym)] n(ym)/[ (1- ρ)N²(ym)], with ym = ( -∆ 
+ m√ρ)/√(1- ρ). This derivative is positive whenever the first term in brackets on the right 
hand side is positive. This is true whenever ym   ≥    -4. Hence default losses tend to grow 
faster in “cheap” macro-states if -√ρ < 0.  
6  Franke, Herrmann and Weber (2008) find in their European sample that the FLP always 
exceeds the expected portfolio loss rate. 
7  Single-tranche deals are often initiated by investors looking for an investment in a 
diversified asset pool with a prespecified tranche  rating. 
8  To provide an intuition, consider a lognormal distribution of the portfolio loss rate and 
derive the attachment points for a B, BB, BBB, A, AA and AAA tranche in a true sale 
transaction according to the idealized probabilities of default according to S&P. Assume a 
transaction with 6 years maturity, WADP = 6 %, loss given default λ= 50% and an 
adjusted diversity score of 40. Then the tranche sizes are depicted in the following Table. 
Tranche rating  Tranche -PD S&P  Tranche size 
AAA  
AA   
A  
BBB  
BB   

















9  Theoretically, a lognormal distribution allows for portfolio loss rates above 1. But for all 
realistic parameter values, the cumulative probability of these loss rates is negligible. 
10  The differences in p-values between the Newey-West and the cluster robust estimates are 
very small.  